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We can chart ourfuture clearly and wisely 
only when we know the path which has led 
to the present. 
- Adlai Stevenson. 
Introduction 
Ethnic conflict in the world today is a 
familiar situation. History is integral to 
understanding the ethnopolitics of any 
nation. Such is the case in Sri Lanka. Sri 
Lanka is an island nation located off the 
southern tip of India's coastline. Its his- 
tory has been as varied as the many 
names it has had, among them 
Tamaraparani, Taprobane, Lanka, Ilam, 
Serendib, Ceylon and, in 1972, Sri Lanka. 
The Sinhalese (mostly Buddhist) consti- 
tute approximately 74 percent of the 
population; the Tamils (mostly Hindu) 
are approximately 18 percent (1981 cen- 
sus); and Tamil-speaking Muslims con- 
stitute 7 percent of the population. Other 
minorities include Burghers1 and Malays. 
Islam was introduced to Ceylon by Arab 
traders around the eighth century A.D. 
The Portuguese introduced Catholicism 
in 1505. In 1638, the Portuguese were 
replaced by the Dutch, who were subse- 
quently overthrown by the British (1796) 
in their quest to expand the British Em- 
pire. The British were a different type of 
invader. Their policies left a lasting im- 
pact on Sri Lanka in a way that had never 
occurred before. Historian D.C. Mendis 
suggested that: 
[the] Portuguese [had] left behind the 
Roman Catholic Church, and the 
Dutch their system of law. The British 
administrative system, helped by the 
great changes brought about by the 
modem industrial civilization, helped 
Ceylon to be unified and the people to 
progress once more (Mendis 1932,8). 
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The British provided the Ceylonese 
with an infrastructure that was quite 
modem. But unification, in a traditional 
nationalist sense (that is, identification 
with the nation as opposed to ethnic or 
regional identification), was noticeably 
absent. Prior to the arrival of the British, 
the northem regions of Sri Lanka were 
not integrated with the south. In fact, 
there were three independent kingdoms. 
"Out of what once were the two 
Sinhalese kingdoms of Kandy and Kotte 
and the Tamil kingdom of Jaffna, in 1802, 
the British created their first crown 
colony, Ceylon" (U.S. Committee for 
Refugees 1991,4). 
English education was beginning to 
be the norm for the higher castes of both 
the Sinhalese (the g o y i g a d )  and their 
Tamil counterparts, the vellalas. The an- 
glicized schooling that prevailed was 
taught at missionary schools in the late 
nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies. 
For many new Christians, motives for 
conversion were more practical than re- 
ligious. They became entitled to free 
schooling. Introduction of the North- 
South railway system facilitated the 
southward migration of English-edu- 
cated Tamils. And, as a result, "during 
the first two decades of Sri Lankan inde- 
pendence, Ceylon Tamils, who consti- 
tutedonly12% of theisland'spopulation, 
held 40% of public sector employment" 
(Perera 1992). There was a feeling in the 
majority community that the minority 
community had a disproportionate hold 
on public service positions. 
Furthermore, during the colonial pe- 
riod, there was growing discontent 
within the Sinhala-Buddhist community 
on the secondary position of Buddhism 
in the country. "The Buddhist revival of 
the second half of the nineteenth century 
was the first phase in the recovery of 
national pride in the island, the first step 
in along process which culminated in the 
growth of nationalism in the twentieth 
century" (De Silva 1981,343). The truth 
of this becomes obvious when placed in 
context. At the time, the British gover- 
nors enforced a policy of state neutrality. 
Buddhism was slowly and convertly 
supported, especially after the Kotahena 
riots of 1883 (a Buddhist-Catholic con- 
flict), with small monetary donations for 
the repair of a dagold and a gift of lamps. 
The incremental growth of Sinhala-Bud- 
dhist nationalism ensured that elitist 
Christian Sinhala leaders, unlike their 
Tamil brethren, would conform to na- 
tionalist principles if they wanted to lead 
that community. Communal conflicts 
were religion-based at the turn of the 
century; as the end of the twentieth cen- 
tury draws near, Sri Lanka is being rav- 
aged by a civil war that has its basis in an 
ethno-cultural perspective. "Ethniciden- 
tity has taken over from religious iden- 
tity" (Stirrat 1984 197). In fact, in the 1983 
riots that devastated Colombo, the Sri 
Lankan capital, both Sinhalese Catholics 
and Buddhists camed out attacks on 
Tamil Catholics (Stirrat 1984). The 
change in the nature and size of the con- 
flict in Sri Lanka has ramifications be- 
yond the tiny nation itself, especially for 
countries at the receiving end of the 
steady stream of refugees from Sri Lanka. 
The ethnic struggle used to have po- 
litical beneficiaries; now there can be no 
beneficiaries until the war is over. The 
evolution and escalation of the conflict 
took place over a number of years with 
the tacit acknowledgment and later di- 
rect intervention of the state. There were 
many indications of where the conflict 
would lead-the type of government 
and its problems after independence and 
the communal riots that plagued the 
country are examples. After 1983, the 
very nature of the conflict changed. But 
the progress of the conflict was left un- 
checked. Painfully tragic results have 
changed the way of life for a nation. 
Stirrings of Discontent 
The religious conflicts that occurred in 
the early 1900s were the Sinhalese and 
Tamils' responses to the emerging sense 
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of animosity against an alien culture with 
all its trappings. One element of the alien 
culture was the Catholic church. There 
were a series of violent encounters be- 
tween Catholics and Buddhists: 
Ambalangoda in 1890, Wadduwa in 
1891, Kalutara in 1897 and 
Anuradhapura in 1903; and between 
Catholics and Hindus Negombo in 1899 
and Neervali in 1902. 
The elite class of Sri Lankan society 
did not have well defined "racial" 
boundaries at the time. They were sirn- 
ply Ceylonese. A combination of wealth 
and English education elevated them to 
that position. They were mobilizing 
among themselves to become a viable 
political force. Their motives were quite 
clear-cut. They were being barred from 
the highest echelons of the land, no mat- 
ter how qualified or how capable. In an 
extreme example, a Whitehall (British 
government) official tolda prominent Sri 
Lankan lawyer that the man chosen to be 
attorney-general "must be a good law- 
yer and ought to be pure white.. ." (De 
Silva 1981,322) . 
Political representation under the 
British was in the form of the Legislative 
Council. The ratio for the council, whose 
purpose was to elicit information about 
local conditions, was fixed, by conven- 
tion, at three Europeans and one from 
each Ceylonese community: Sinhalese, 
Tamil and Burgher. However, the effec- 
tiveness of the representation was 
greatly limited by the fact that the succes- 
sive Sri Lankan members of the council 
all tended to come from the same fami- 
lies. Finally the Ceylon National Con- 
gress was formed in 1917; it was a 
multiracial, multidenominational party 
whose common links were elitist in na- 
ture. Until 1921, its leader was Sir 
Ponnambalam Arunachalam, a Tamil, 
whose prestige was so great that it subse- 
quently made his post prestigious: 
What distinguished elite politics in 
Ceylon in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century from succeeding 
decades was the harmony that pre- 
vailed between the Sinhalese and 
Tamil leaderships. In the political jar- 
gon of the day there were two majority 
communities, the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils, and the minorities were the 
smaller racial groups. The situation 
changed findamentally after 1922 [the 
time of the Donoughmore Constitu- 
tion] when . . . there was one majority 
community - the Sinhalese- the Tamils 
now regarding themselves increas- 
ingly as a minority community. It has 
remained so ever since (De Silva 1981, 
387). 
According to K.M. De Silva, this 
promising time inSriLankanhistory was 
unparalleled. However, there were 
stirrings of trouble from the outset. It is 
true that these were not of ethnic lean- 
ings, but were instead due to the fact that 
the Ceylon National Congress was the 
bastion of the elite, none of whom shared 
the same political outlook. When the 
party was formed, there were two iden- 
tifiable factions: the constitutional elite, 
who proposed a political goal of respon- 
sible self-government for Ceylon as a 
member of the British Empire. The other 
sector was radical; they favoured force- 
ful opposition to British rule in the tradi- 
tion of the Indian model. 
In 1919, Sir William Manning, the 
new British governor, amved. He did 
not approve of the Ceylon National Con- 
gress (CNC) and he used his consider- 
able power to hasten the path of 
self-destruction that the CNC appeared 
to be taking. By the late 1920~~ after the 
deliberations over the Donoughmore 
Constitution, the shift towards ethnocen- 
tric perspectives began. "Whilst the 
Sinhalese leaders favoured the 'one man, 
one vote' system, Tamil leaders objected 
to this on the grounds that it would give 
the Sinhalese majority total control over 
the country, and so they demanded some 
sort of communal representation to safe- 
guard their position" (Stirrat 1984,198). 
But the Tamil leaders did not get what 
they demanded. Sri Lanka was unique at 
that stage. It was a full twenty years 
ahead of its African and Asian counter- 
parts in the British Empire or Common- 
wealth with its universal suffrage. In 
1931, 1936 and 1947, legislatures were 
elected by means of universal suffrage 
and the Sinhalese majority began to get 
more and more power because of their 
numbers. 
Disenfranchisement and the Issue 
of Colonization 
When Sri Lanka became an independent 
nation in 1948, replete with Westrnin- 
ster-style democracy, Britain and the 
Ceylonese overlooked a fundamental 
flaw. By ignoring the fact that, although 
Tamils constituted a minority of the gen- 
eral population, they constituted a very 
definite majority in certain areas of Sri 
Lanka - the northern and, to a slightly 
lesser degree, eastern parts of the coun- 
try - Sri Lanka was left in a state that 
could easily have led to disarray and 
eventually did so. 
Colonization was and remains an 
important issue of conflict. It was the 
government-sponsored colonization 
schemes of predominantly Tamil areas 
that caused a problem. "Tamils see it as a 
deliberate attempt to deprive their areas 
of continuity and thus decrease their 
communal bargaining power. They 
point out that hardly any Tamils have 
been settled under official auspices in 
Sinhalese areas" (Schwarz 1988,lO). The 
colonization schemes began in the 1930s. 
One of the largest of the pre-1953 projects 
was the one at Gal Oya in the Amparai 
District, which was initially a predomi- 
nantly Tamil area. 
Table 1: Population Change in  Selected Districts 
Tamils Sinhalese 
1953 1971 % Change 1953 1971 % Change 
Jaffna 477,304 673,043 41 6,183 20,402 230 
Batticaloa 130,381 246,582 89 31,174 94,150 202 
Trincomalee 37,517 73,255 95 15,296 55,308 262 
Puttalam 9,010 30,994 244 31,587 309,298 879 
Data adapted from Schwarz 1988,lO 
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The settlement of large numbers of 
Sinhalese peasants in the Gal Oya 
Basin made it feasible for the govern- 
ment to create a separate electoral dis- 
trict for the Sinhalese and increase 
Sinhalese representation in the parlia- 
ment. Indeed, the Amparai Electoral 
District is represented by a Sinhalese 
member of parliament (Manogaran 
1987,93). 
Such colonization has long been rec- 
ognized as a part of Tamil grievances 
because of the loss of power to Tamil 
representation. However, the schemes 
have been amplified as shown in Table 1. 
The prime minister of the newly-in- 
dependent Sri Lanka, D.S. Senanayake, 
assured G.G. Ponnambalam and his 
Tamil Congress that Tamil rights would 
be protected under the direction of the 
United National Party (UNP). He con- 
vinced Ponnambalam and others, to 
cross the flwr and join the UNP. Among 
those who remained in Opposition were 
S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a Tamil Chris- 
tian, and his retinue, who vehemently 
opposed the disenfranchisement of In- 
dian Tamils who were rendered stateless 
by D.S. Senanayake's government in 
1949. "The legislation denying citizen- 
ship and voting rights to most Indian 
Tamils was passed by a Sinhalese-domi- 
nated parliament to satisfy the Kandyan 
Sinhalese, who were resentful [because] 
. . . the agricultural land and employment 
opportunities for the indigenous popu- 
lation were limited (Manogaran 1987, 
19). But the underlying fear of Sinhalese 
politicians was that the Tamil popula- 
tion, Indian and Sri Lankan, would unite 
against the Sinhalese. 
The ease with which the laws were 
passed distressed Chelvanayakam who 
then founded the Federal Party (FP). His 
view was that within a unitary form of 
government, minority rights were not 
protected and indeed were in consider- 
able jeopardy. He said, " [today], justiceis 
being denied to Indian Tamils. Some day 
in the future, when language becomes 
the issue, the same [will] befall the 
Ceylon Tamils" (Ram 1989,37). The dis- 
enfranchisement of the Indian Tamils 
became a contentious issue that demon- 
strated how much was lacking in the 
government structure. Much of the 
blame can be connected to the elite poli- 
ticians who formulated the political 
structure. On a very simplistic level it 
could be argued that because of their 
Anglicization, they could not see the 
necessity of takingintoaccount the needs 
of the thasses. However, it is more likely 
that they chose to ignore the social real- 
ity, naively assuming that the 5 to 6 per- 
cent English-speaking population 
would remain in power after successive 
elections. By not acknowledging these 
realities, the elitists orchestrated their 
own downfall. 
Emergence of the Language Issue 
The man who would eventually destroy 
the elitist stranglehold on power came 
from that social stratum. Solomon West 
Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, originally 
a Christian, was a member of a wealthy, 
prominent Sinhalese family. S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike's father was an Anglo- 
phile who named his son for the British 
governor, James West Ridgeway. Al- 
thoughBandaranaike was very well edu- 
cated in English (he attended Oxford), he 
was illiterate in Sinhala4; he was also the 
man who was swept into power under 
the auspices of the "Sinhala Only" Act. 
There was a growing sense of alienation 
with the realization that although Eng- 
lish was spoken by a very small minority, 
it was the language of the state: the 
courts, police, parliamentary debates, 
government administration, banking 
and university instruction. "Initially, the 
Sinhala-language movement was purely 
anti-Western, but later it began to de- 
velop anti-Tamil overtones as well" 
(McGowan 1992, 155). Both Sinhalese 
and Tamil nationalists denounced Eng- 
lish as an official language. Instead, they 
advocated a return to suxlbasha,5 which 
would provide equal rights for both 
Tamil and Sinhalese languages. Soon, 
however, Bandaranaike was exploiting 
the explosive language issue for his own 
political purposes. The election year was 
1956, which fortunately for 
Bandaranaike, was also the year of the 
Buddha Jayanthi: 
Jayanthi was the 2,500 year anniver- 
sary of the Buddha's enlightenment, 
the very epicenter of his 5,000 year 
teaching. A that point, Buddhists be- 
lieved, the dhanna would be spread 
throughout the world and would pm 
duce an unprecedented spiritual 
awakening. In Lanka, Jayanthi had an 
even greater significance, making the 
completion of 2,500 years of Bud- 
dhism, the life of the Sinhalese race, 
and the length of recorded history and 
continuous political institutions, a 
threefold event of great mystical 
power in the Sinhalese mind 
(McGowan 1992,150-1). 
The Buddha Jayanthi wasinstrumen- 
tal in bringingreligion into the fray of the 
language and culture wars. With 
Bandaranaike denouncing" the invisible 
yoke of evil, unenlightened teachings, 
practices, habits, customs, and views fos- 
tered by the British" (McGowan 1992, 
El) ,  the bhikkhus (Buddhist monks) were 
encouraging many Sinhalese to vote for 
Bandaranaike. 
At the time of independence, Sri 
Lanka was left with two major parties 
and some smaller exclusively Tamil par- 
ties. The ruling UNP was technically a 
non-ethnic party. In reality, its members 
were "committed to Sinhalese national- 
ism" (Obeyesekere 1984, 156); but the 
UNP was also committed to unity, or 
more realistically, committed to allaying 
the fears of either community: " . . .[Sir 
John] Kotelawala [then prime minister] 
assured the Sri Lankan Tamils, during a 
visit to Jaffna in late 1954, that appropri- 
atelegislation wouldbe adopted to make 
both Sinhala and Tamil the official lan- 
guages of the country" (Manogaran 
1987, 43). This action dismayed many 
Sinhalese. Bandaranaike capitalized on 
their fears. 
The UNP reversed its position in 1955 
by declaring that Sinhala should be the 
official language, but it was a futile ac- 
tion. To vote for the UNP, the bhikkhus 
assured the populace, would be cultural 
suicide. The reversal of theUNP position 
on language deprived them of whatever 
popular supwrt they had from the Tamil 
population. It was no surprise then that 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the 
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) coa- 
lition6 won a landslide victory in the 
April 1956 election. Bandaranaike had 
said that the Official Language Act 
would have a provision for what he 
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called "reasonable use cif Tamil." How- 
ever, once in power, any attempt he 
made to include Tamil in the Official 
Language Act was greeted with derision, 
and the Opposition accused the prime 
minister of conceding the rights of the 
Sinhalese to the Tamils. The Federal 
Party (led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam) or- 
ganized peaceful mass demonstrations 
against the "Sinhala Only" Act. Infuri- 
demands of regional autonomy. In fact, 
in 1926 Bandaranaike promoted the 
federal state structure, within the exist- 
ing unitary state framework to appease 
the Kandyan Sinhalese, who were de- 
manding autonomy. The EC Pact was 
considered "one of the few statesman- 
likecompromises.. . ever tobeattempted 
in Sri Lanka" (Ponnambalam 1983,112). 
It was abandoned when Sinhalese Bud- 
There was a growing cnuareness among Tamil leaders that their 
Sinhalese companiots, with whom they had agitaed for 
independencejivm the British, were quite willing to subjugate 
T M  if it was politically advantageous. 
ated Sinhalese mobs beat the Tamil 
protesters; "[this] violense was accom- 
panied by an anti-Tamil riot, resulting in 
the killing of more than one hundred 
Tanlils at the government-sponsored 
GalOya colonization schemein Amparai 
District" (Manogaran 19$7,48). 
There was a growing awareness 
amongTamil leaders that their Sinhalese 
compatriots, with whom they had a@- 
tated for independence from the British, 
were quite willing to subjugate Tamils if 
it was politically advantageous. The 
Tamil leaders, too, had their motives for 
their political strategies; however, much 
of their energies were devbted to fighting 
the openly disaiminatory policies that 
the MEP coalition had introduced. By 
1957, the Federal Party threatened 
Bandaranaike with a campaign of 
satyugraha7 unless their demands-par- 
ity between Sinhalese and Tamil as two 
offidal languages, an end to the planned 
Sinhalese colonization of predominantly 
Tamil areas, the granting of citizenship 
rights to "Indian Tamils", and most im- 
portantly, regional autonDmy were met. 
Bandaranaike " . . . wasconvinced that 
the Tamils were determined to defend 
their legitimate rights and, in order to 
avert a major ethnic conflict, he agreed to 
negotiates political settlement to the con- 
flict in July 1957" (Manogaran 1987,49). 
The settlement was known as the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) 
Pact. Both leaders agreed on a devolu- 
tion of powers in order to meet the 
dhist extremists and the Opposition 
voiced their protests in a multitude of 
ways. One of the most famous, by J.R. 
Jayewardeneof the UNP (who wasorigi- 
nally a Christian), was the October 4, 
1957 march to Kandy to invoke divine 
blessings for the campaign against the B- 
CPact. Jayewardene, who would lead Sri 
Lanka after 1977, then said: "[the] time 
has come for the whole Sinhalese race, 
which has existed for 2,500 years jeal- 
ously safeguarding its language and reli- 
gion, to fight without giving any quarter 
to save its birthright" (McGowan 1992, 
161). It was said that the B-C Pact would 
have reasonably assuaged Tamil fears of 
domination, but when it was abrogated 
nation or state is incomprehensible to 
the popular mind. The emphasis on 
the sense of uniqueness of the 
Sinhalese past, and the focus on Sri 
Lanka as the land of the Sinhalese and 
the country in which Buddhism stood 
forthin its purest form, carried memo- 
tional appeal compared with which a 
multi-dal policwas a meaningless 
abstraction (De Silva 1981,512). 
While the Sinhalese government was 
trying to implement its policies, the 
Tamil politiaans were attempting to 
make clear the distinction between 
Sinhalese nationalism and Ceylonese 
nationalism, which were being equated 
at the time. 
Even in 1951, the Federal Party was 
setting out the configurations for Tamil 
nationalism centred around the 
language, history and distinctiveness of 
the culture. In 1958, after satyagraha 
went into effect, the country was aflame 
with riots and four days passed without 
the declaration of a state of emergency. 
Hundreds of innocent civilians were 
murdered. People were tortured, beaten 
and shot simply for not being able to 
pronounce certain words correctly; a 
number of goondass killed their own peo- 
ple who were too frightened to pro- 
nounce words correctly. The 
government's lack of response would 
prove to be the rule instead of the excep 
tion, and Tamils, moderates and extrem- 
ists, were infuriated (Vittachi 1958). 
The Tamil leaders, too, had their motives for their political 
strategies; however, much of their energies were devoted to 
fighting the openly discriminatory policies that the MEP 
coalition had introduced. 
in April 1958, the threatened campaign 
of satyagraha was enforced. Sri Lanka 
succumbed to a wave of nationalist ten- 
dencies as KM. De Silva explains: 
[one] of the immediate consequences 
of the transformation of nationalism 
was that the concept of a multi-racial 
polity was no longer politically viable. 
In Sinhalese the words for nation, race 
and people are practically synonymous 
and a multi-racial or multicommunal 
Bandaranaike also had to deal with .the 
many and often bitter conflicts within his 
coalition government. On September 26, 
1959, he was assassinated by a bhikku 
who belonged to a radical right-wing 
faction of the coalition. Bandaranaike's 
wife, Sirima, immediately assumed 
power. Many Sinhalese and Tamil lead- 
ers had two very different ideologies as 
to where Sri Lanka should head in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, This 
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difkrence of opinion would wentually 
lead to disaster. 
The politics of the 1%0s were essen- 
tially under the control of Mrs. Sirima 
Bandaranaike, the leader of the Sri h d c a  
Freedom Party (SLFP), who was re- 
turned topowerinJuly1960. Theworld's 
first female prime minister was "not re- 
luctant to take on two inflammable is- 
sues at the same time" (De Silva 1981, 
512). She passed the provisions of the 
'Sinhala Only' bill into effect which 
stated that Sinhala should be the lan- 
guage of administration by 1961. "The 
Tamil people must accept the fact that 
the Sinhala majority will no longer per- 
mit themselves to be cheated of their 
rights" (McGowan 1992, 161), she ex- 
plained. This was despite the unofficial 
for the armed struggle that ensued in the 
following decades. 
Mrs. Bandaranaike's party stayed in 
power until 1965 when Dudley Sena- 
nayake (son of former prime minister, 
D.S. Senanayake), returned to the office 
of Prime Minister, which he held briefly 
in 195253. Dudley Senanayake came 
when Sri Lanka's literacy (excluding the 
0-4 age group) was almost 85 percent. 
"[As] a result of its long standing 
commitment to free education (in the 
sense of free tuition) at all levels- 
primary, secondary and tertiary-% 
Lanka in the 1960s became an outstand- 
ing example of the growing global phe- 
nomenon of educated unemployed" (De 
Silva 1981, 538). Dudley Senanayake's 
government devised a program of agri- 
The problem has changed in mature. Initially, the c& was a 
constitutional one involving the protection of basic minority 
righ& that were subject to political exploitation. In more recent 
years, increased militancy has rendered the concept of 
polih'cal victors inconceivable. 
electoral promises she had made to the 
FP. The Federal Party, in turn, initiated 
civil disobedience, which led, for the first 
time, to military suppression of the Tamil 
disobedience in the north and east. Mrs. 
Bandaranaike also implemented state 
control over all state-aided secondary 
schools. The powerful Roman Catholic 
minority was incensed and fought 
against it. However, they, too, were 
forced to acquiesce. 
In 1962, the armed forces (consisting 
mainly of Sinhalese Christians and 
Burghers) attempted a coup $&at that 
was put down. The acceptance of 
"Sinhala Only" by the major parties gave 
rise to an exodus of disillusioned intelli- 
gentsia from all communities who left Sri 
Lanka to go to England, Canada, Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand. Many Tamils 
also went to "Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia 
and other emergent countries of Africa 
which wanted their learning, skills and 
expertise" (Po~ambalam 1983, 112). 
These wealthy expatriates would ulti- 
mately serve as a financial support base 
cultural activities designed to incorpo- 
rate the ranks of the unemployed, but the 
educated were not interested in those 
types of jobs. The educated unemployed 
became very receptive to the criticisms 
made by the Opposition. 
Mrs. Bandaranaike came back into 
power in 1970 after combining the SLFP 
with the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and 
the Communist Party under the banner 
of the United Front (UF). Mrs. 
Bandaranaike introduced ethnic quotas 
at universities in response to a general 
Sinhalese feeling that Tamils were some- 
how being favoured in admissions. The 
system of quotas, known as "standardi- 
zation," was implemented in 1972. It was 
a system "in which marks obtained by 
candidates for university admission 
[were] weighted by giving advantage to 
certain linguistic groups and/or certain 
districts" (Schwarz 1988,9). The govern- 
ment ostensibly sought to help the less 
proficient areas of Sri Lanka - in par- 
ticular, Kandy and the upcountry 
Sinhalese. 
~ o w w e r ,  this goal was not necessar- 
ily achieved: 
[Standardizqtion] did not lead to bet- 
ter chances for schools in backward 
and rural areasasis sometimes alleged. 
In fact provincial distribution of places 
remained almost unaltered except for 
a fall in the share of science admissions 
from the Northern province. It is in the 
ethnicbreakdown that the real impact 
can be seen. The percentage of Tamil 
medium students entering courses in 
engineering fell from 40.8% in 19701 1 
to24.496 in 197314 (De SilvainSchwarz 
1988,9). 
The corresponding period saw the 
emergence of m e d  militancy among 
Tamil students. Tamil moderate leaders 
became increasingly discredited in the 
eyes of the Tamil people because of is- 
sues like standardization but what fi- 
nally reduced their political clout was 
their inability to protect the Tamil popu- 
lation from violence. Mrs. Bandara- 
naike's government clamped down hard 
on Tamils who supported secession, and 
Tamils living in predominantly 
Sinhalese areas began to feel the brunt of 
the repression. Those who lived in the 
North also faced repression in many 
quarters, and they reacted: 
' The result was a spreading militancy 
and the growth of a martial spirit in a 
people who had long been known for 
passiveness .... But a generation of 
Tamil youth, raised in &I almost per- 
petual state okonflict with the govem- 
kent-boycotts of schools, picketingof 
government offices, the performance 
of satyagraha, and the hoisting of black 
flags to protest government action+ 
had been radicalized (McGowan 1992, 
In). 
These radicalized youth, determined 
and fuelled by the conduct of the state 
police force, were the beginnings of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam mili- 
tant group. In 1975, their leader, 
Velupillai Prabhakeran, led a small 
group w ~ d - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  forthe 
killing o pro-government mayor of 
Jaffna. In retabtion, the police and the 
army detained and tortured over one 
hundred Tamil students for a year. None 
were ever formally charged, "establish- 
ing a pattern of collective punishment for 
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acts committedagainst Sinhaleseauthor- 
ity" (McGowan 1992, 177). After each 
communal riot, one of the most violent 
occurring in 1977, Tamils increasingly 
viewed the conflicts as struggles for per- 
sonal and cultural survival instead of a 
confrontation over constitutional rights. 
The escalation was visible and Mrs. 
Bandaranaike's government was instru- 
mental in using the police and armed 
forces as weapons of the state against its 
own indigenous population. 
In 1977, J.R. Jayewatdene and the 
UNP came to power. It was a year of 
reckoning for Sri Ladca. During the elec- 
tion campaign "[the] people's hatred of 
the long queues for essential foodstuffs, 
of injustices . . . had been exploited with 
skill. At the same time wery reactionary 
tendency, too, had been made use of" 
(Piyadasa 1984,%). In the same election, 
a majority of Tamils supported the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) position 
as enunciated in the Vaddukoddai reso- 
lution: 
The convention resolves that the resto- 
ration and recowtitution of the Free, 
Sovereign, Secular Socialist State of 
Tamil EELAM based on the right of 
self determination inherent to every 
nation has become inevitable in order 
to safeguard the very exbtence of the 
Tamil nation in this country (TULF in 
Perera 1992). 
Jayewardene had made electoral 
promises tothe Tamils specifically about 
their employment and education griev- 
ances. But like many other Sinhalese 
leaders, these were more platitudes than 
promises. By 197% the Tigers were carry- 
ing out more attacks on people and struc- 
tures that had government links. In July 
of that same year, Jayewardene gave the 
the army a mandate to enforce the Pre- 
vention of Terrorism Act, which cur- 
tailed civil liberties and enforced what 
could essentially be called military rule 
in the northern and eastern provinces. In 
1981, there was spate of mti-Tamil vio- 
lence in response to attado by the Tamil 
Tigers, but the communal riots of 1983 
were the catalysts for full-fledged avil 
war. 
At present, Sri Lanka is a country in 
dire straits. Refugees stream out of the 
country in record numbers to escape the 
consequences of the daily battles being 
fought in the north and east. Post-1983 
has been a traumatic time for Sri Lanka. 
The Sinhala-Tamil conflict, which could 
have been averted with some fore- 
thought and a strong stance against po- 
litical exploitation, appears to be 
uncontrollable in its present state. The 
problem has changed in nature. Initially, 
the crisis was a constitutional one involv- 
ingthe protection of basicminority rights 
that were subject to politicalexploitation. 
Inmore recent years, inaeasedmilitancy 
has rendered the concept of political vic- 
tors inconceivable. The survival of Sri 
Lankan society is now threatened, and 
the composition of minorities in the so- 
cial fabric has been tom asunder. Inflam- 
matory statements are the norm now for 
both the Sinhalese and Tamils. Sri Lanka 
is undergoing a most difficult time in its 
history. It remains to be seen whether a 
solution [see Manogaran in this issue ] or 
solutions can be found to the complex 
and convoluted questions that make up 
the conflict. 
Notes 
Burghers: The Eurasian descendants of 
Dutch colonists. 
Goyigama: the highest of the major 
Sinhalese castes; there are subcastes within 
the caste of the goyigama. Literally "agri- 
culturalist" (Vellala: the Tarnilequivalent of 
goyigama). The parallel caste systems of 
both Sinhalese and Tamils indicates the 
similarity between the two groups. "[It] 
may wellbe that SinhaleseandTamilshave 
much in common genetically, their separa- 
tion being, like so many similar cleavages 
the world over, primarily a linguistic and 
cultural one" (Farmer 1%3,8). In much of 
the literature concerning this subject, 
"race" and "ethnicity" have been used in- 
terchangeably. [see Ramchandran in this is- 
sue on the role of  culture in the ethnic amfiict] 
Dagoba: A Buddhist relic mound. 
The language is Sinhala. The people and 
culture are S i e s e .  
Swrrbasha: Indigenous languages-Siala 
and Tamil 
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna was formed 
by Bandaranaike's party, the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party, the Viplavakari 
[~evolutionar~] ~ ~ a n k a  ~ m a  ~ a k a j a  party, 
the Basha Peramuna (Language Front) and 
independents. 
7. Satyapha:  Civil disobedience movement 
along the Gandhian pattern. 
8. Goonda: Hoodlum, unemployable 
vagabond 
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